The Accommodation Dilemma

Balancing reputational and material concerns when responding to non-cooperative behavior

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In situations where other states behave non-cooperatively, governments need to decide whether to accommodate or take a tough stance against this behavior. In doing so, they face an "accommodation dilemma": Even though a tough stance can be materially costly, governments have incentives to sanction and not accommodate non-cooperative behavior for reputational reasons. However, bringing voters on board with this approach can be challenging. This paper examines to which extent the trade-off between the material benefits of cooperation and reputational considerations influences the extent to which citizens are willing to support a tough and materially costly response. Using survey experiments embedded in real-life contexts, it examines how voters respond to the accommodation dilemma across three types of non-cooperative behavior: a) cherry-picking attempts and non-compliance, b) serious violations of international law and c) coercive bargaining in international negotiations. Across all cases, the experiments show that highlighting the reputational risks associated with accommodation tends to make voters less willing, and highlighting the material consequences of non-accommodation more willing, to compromise. Dilemma situations, in contrast, are difficult: Sometimes the willingness not to accommodate is strengthened when both types of cost are emphasized, sometimes muted. Overall, the paper shows that voters understand strategic foreign policy considerations and care about their country's reputation beyond the security realm.

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In international relations, states cooperate in myriad ways because this often is mutually beneficial. However, not all international relations are cooperative. States also face non-cooperative behavior by other states and then have to decide on how to respond. For example, Russia's invasion into Ukraine, the US's blocking of the WTO appellate body, or the UK's exit from the European Union all confronted other countries with difficult questions of whether and how to respond to these unilateral challenges to international norms and institutions. Should they seek to accommodate the challenging country's demands? Should they take a tough stance and refuse any changes to the status quo? Or seek some kind of compromise in the middle ground?

Answering these questions is not easy and confronts states with difficult choices. Usually, countries engage in non-cooperative behavior in order to improve their position vis-à-vis that of other countries. Some states seek to renegotiate the terms of existing international agreement to their own advantage, for example. Others try to change the negotiated distribution of cooperation gains in their favor by failing to comply with the agreed terms of cooperation. Yet others engage in coercive bargaining tactics to extract some advantage for themselves. In the most glaring cases, states try to force other states to change the status quo by military means.

Such unilateral non-cooperative challenges confront other countries with a choice between *accommodating* these demands and maintaining cooperative relations, even though they are less advantageous for them going forward and may encourage the challenging state (and/or other states) to pursue similar strategies in the future, or whether to take a tough, *non-accommodating* stance in order to convince the challenging state to return to the existing terms of cooperation, or to at least pay a price in terms of lost cooperation gains. The latter outcome, however, tends to be costly for the other states as well. States thus face an *"accommodation dilemma"* (Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2022; Walter 2020, 2021b): not accommodating non-cooperative behavior is costly, but accommodation may encourage more such behavior.

States thus can have strong incentives to take a tough stance and to sanction and not accommodate non-cooperative behavior. Given the costs of this strategy, one obvious problem with this approach is, however, to bring domestic stakeholders on board. Convincing them that taking a non-accommodating stance is worth the (often material) cost, can be challenging. For example, the sanctions that Western countries imposed against Russia in 2022 to signal that core norms of international cooperation such as territorial sovereignty cannot be violated at little cost, have been very costly for Western economies, especially in Europe. The price of this non-accommodative strategy involved roaring energy costs and a recession. This raises difficult question about the political price governments may have to pay for such a non-accommodation

strategy. At the same time, voters care about their country's reputation for resolve (Kertzer 2016), and may thus reward their governments' tough response.

This paper focuses on one specific, important domestic stakeholder group – voters – and their preferred response to situations in which one country tries to unilaterally improve international relations in its favor. Voters matter in international relations and negotiations: First, governments have been found to be responsive to their voters' preferences in a number of negotiation contexts (Hagemann, Hobolt, and Wratil 2017; McLean and Whang 2014; Schneider 2019; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Wratil 2018). Voters also matter because their ability to impose audience costs on leaders can increases governments' resolve in international negotiations (e.g., Fearon 1994; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Tomz 2007). This is particularly likely for high-profile negotiations, because voters invest energy and effort to learn about international issues when their relevance increases (Pelc 2013). Voters' preferences can therefore enhance the bargaining power of governments in international negotiations (Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012; Hug and König 2002; Putnam 1988; Schneider and Cederman 1994). To the extent that international cooperation has become increasingly politicized in recent years (De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021; Zürn 2014; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012), these mechanisms are likely to be increasingly important.

Against this background, it is important to understand the following questions: How do voters want their governments to respond to unilateral, non-cooperative behavior that both reputational and more material concerns regarding cooperation gains on the line? Can governments convince their citizens that taking a non-accommodating position is worth the potential pain of this strategy, and if so, how? I expect that voters' preferred response is related to the costs accommodation and non-accommodation. If the potentially high material costs of non-accommodation are highlighted, voters should become more willing to tolerate non-cooperative behavior in order to continue to benefit from cooperation with the challenging state. In contrast, emphasizing the reputational risks associated with accommodation should increase voters' support for an uncompromising stance. Finally, predictions about how voters will respond when are told that both accommodating and not accommodating carry costs are less clear. On the one hand, highlighting the accommodation dilemma could lead to a more muted response among respondents. On the other hand, highlighting that non-accommodation is a costly action might reinforce voters' belief in the effectiveness of the signal and might hence strengthen support for non-accommodation. The paper thus explores some the domestic sources of resolve in international relations and thus contributes to research on resolve, coercive diplomacy, crisis bargaining, and audience costs (Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Chaudoin 2014a;

Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014; Fearon 1997; George 1991; Gueorguiev, McDowell, and Steinberg 2020; Kertzer 2016; Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Tomz 2007; Walter 2009; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015).

Empirically, I evaluate this argument with survey experiments that explor respondents' willingness to accommodate three types of non-cooperative behavior: a) cherry-picking attempts and non-compliance b) serious violations of international law and c) coercive bargaining in international negotiations. The experiments were conducted in a variety of real-life contexts, thus increasing the external validity of the study. To examine cherry-picking attempts and non-compliance, I examine how EU-27 Europeans respond to British and Swiss demands to retain privileged access to the EU's Single market and to countries that do not comply with core rule of law norms in the European Union. To study responses to serious violations of international law, I examine support for sanctions against Russia in reaction to the Ukraine war in Hungary, Sweden and Finland. A third set of analyses focuses on coercive bargaining and explores voters' responses to Turkey's blockage of Swedish/Finnish NATO accession and the withholding of EU funds to force Hungary to implements judicial reforms.

In all experiments, respondents receive different vignettes that highlight the reputational cost of accommodation, the material cost of non-accommodation, or both. The findings suggest that highlighting the reputational risks of accommodation tends to make voters less willing to compromise. At the same time, highlighting the material non-accommodation costs tends to make respondents more accommodating. Dilemma situations, in contrast are difficult for respondents: Sometimes the willingness not to accommodate is strengthened when both types of cost are emphasized, sometimes muted.

Overall, the paper shows across a whole range of different real-life situations that voters understand strategic foreign policy considerations and care about their country's reputation beyond the security realm. This has important policy implications for policymakers seeking to garner public support for an uncompromising line. The findings suggest that clearly communicating the rationale for a non-accommodating strategy and the reputational risks associated with accommodation is likely to increase support for a tough response.

Argument

Although international cooperation tends to be beneficial for states, not all cooperative agreements are equally beneficial to all parties, and states can end up dissatisfied with the status quo. This creates incentives for them to behave non-cooperatively. Such behavior includes demands to renegotiate existing international agreements or the withdrawal from international

treaties or organizations. It also includes non-compliance with international norms or agreements, which can range from minor infractions to major violations of core international norms. This can occur both quietly when states simply refuse to implement the policies they committed to, and very openly when states invade other countries or openly refuse to comply with international law. Finally, states can try to change the status quo by engaging in coercive bargaining that seeks to extract concessions from another country by threatening to impose significant costs. In essence, all of these actions aim at rebalancing the costs and benefits of cooperation in favor of the challenging state. For the targeted state, its government and its citizens, this raises the question of how to respond.

To accommodate or not? Responding to non-cooperative behavior

Countries confronted with non-cooperative behavior have a choice in how they respond. They can either try to give in to the challenging country (accommodation) or firmly reject their demands (non-accommodation), although in reality, most responses will be placed somewhere in the middle of a continuum between these two options as end points. Accommodating the challenging state's demands means that the country accepts the demands of the challenging country. This allows the state to maintain cooperative relations with the challenging state, even though the concessions made will tend to benefit the challenging country more and the responding country less. Examples for these kinds of strategy range from the 1984 decision of the then EC member states to grant the UK a rebate in membership fees, over Switzerland's decision to significantly relax bank secrecy in the face of US and EU pressure, to appeasement, where the UK and France accommodated Nazi Germany's demand to annex the Sudentenland, a region in Czechoslovakia primarily inhabited by ethnic Germans. On the other end of the continuum, the responding state refuses to give in to the challenging country's demands and thus takes a non-accommodating stance. This means it refuses to make any concessions, offers minimal compromises, threatens to end (and actually ending) cooperation, or even takes punitive measures against the challenging country for its uncooperative behavior. An example is the refusal of eurozone governments in 2015 to accommodate a Greek referendum-based request for more generous bailout conditions and their insistence that Greece either accept the conditionality or leave the Eurozone.

The challenge for the responding state is that both accommodation and non-accommodation have their benefits, but both can also carry significant costs (Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2022; Walter 2020). Because *accommodation* means that the demands of the challenging country are largely met, this is, of course, a very good outcome for the challenging

state. It is less beneficial for the responding state, however. While it does allow them to maintain cooperative relations with the challenging country, it reduces the benefits they get from this cooperation. Moreover, accommodation can harm a country's reputation in the long run (Kertzer 2016; Tingley and Walter 2011; Walter 2006, 2009). For example, accommodation may signal that the government is likely to back down in similar disputes in the future, thus damaging its reputation for resolve (Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015). The challenging state and/or other countries may take note of this and may pose similar challenges in the future. In a nutshell, choosing accommodation in response to non-cooperative behavior allows state to maintain cooperative relations, but leads to negative consequences for a country's reputation, and both governments and voters are likely to view this unfavorably.

Table 1: Distribution of risks and best response to non-cooperative behavior

		Material stakes at risk	
		Low	high
Reputational risk	Low	Weak accommodation dilemma	Accommodation
	High	Non-accommodation	Strong accommodation dilemma

The second ideal-type response to non-cooperative behavior – non-accommodation – avoids these reputational problems. This strategy has two important advantages: First, it increases the odds that the challenging state abandons its non-cooperative behavior or demands. A second, more long-term, benefit is that it bolsters the responding state's reputation as one that won't be pushed around by non-cooperative behavior. This effect is likely to be particularly large when non-accommodation comes in the form of a clearly visible action (Katagiri and Min 2019). Unfortunately, non-accommodation can be very costly in material terms. These costs can be relatively minor, such as small fines for non-compliance. But they can also become substantial, especially if the challenging state does not back down. For instance, if Canada and Mexico had refused to accommodate US President Trump's bid to renegotiate NAFTA in favor of the US, they would have risked a huge economic fallout had Trump decided to terminate the treaty. Similarly, had Greece exited the common currency rather than ultimately accept harsh bailout conditions, this would most likely have caused a major financial crisis in the Eurozone.

Whereas these costs can be avoided if the challenging state backs down quickly, they can become sizable quickly and affect a broad range of domestic societal actors if the challenging state does not. These costs present a challenge to governments, as they can reduce (and in the worst case undermine) their support from domestic stakeholders.

In short, faced with non-cooperative behavior of other states, countries have different options of how to respond, but both of these have advantages and disadvantages in reputational and material terms. The choice between strategies is relatively straightforward when one type of cost clearly dominates the other (see Tab. 1): When material risks clearly dominate reputational ones, the best response will be to accommodate the challenge, whereas non-accommodation is the best response when reputational risks associated with accommodation are large and the potential cost of non-accommodation are small. The choice is much harder when material and reputational risks are of equal size. Especially when both of these risks are large, governments face *"accommodation dilemma"* (Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2022; Walter 2020, 2021b): not accommodating non-cooperative behavior is costly, but accommodation may encourage more such behavior. In these situations, governments have incentives to sanction and not accommodate non-cooperative behavior for reputational reasons, even though this can be materially costly. However, given the material costs of this strategy, bringing voters on board for this approach can be challenging.

Implications for voters

What does this imply for how voters navigate the trade-off between the material cost and the reputational advantages of non-accommodation, how this influences the extent to which they are willing to support a tough and materially costly response, and how elites may be able to convince voters of their preferred strategy. I expect voters to weigh the reputational and material costs against each other and to evaluate their government's response options to non-cooperative behavior accordingly. We know that voters care about their country's reputation (Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Kertzer 2016), as well as reciprocity (Chilton, Milner, and Tingley 2017), fairness (Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012). Voters also take the strategic motivations of prominent foreign leaders into account when thinking about foreign policy issues (Gravelle 2018). When compromises are necessary in international negotiations, they care about whether their country played an active or passive role in facilitating the compromise (Brutger 2021). And they voice concerns that accommodating a challenging state could encourage others to launch similar challenges in the future (Walter 2021b). All this suggests that voters tend to understand the reputational dynamics that an accommodation strategy can potentially unleash.

But voters are also likely to vary in how they assess the reputational risks associated with accommodation. For example, some voters are likely to be very concerned about upholding their country's reputation for adhering to international law, whereas others may not care so much about international law in the first place and hence will be less concerned about such reputational effects.

Likewise, voters generally care about the material gains that international interactions generate (e.g., Franchino and Segatti 2017). Consequently, they are likely to bristle at the costs associated with a non-accommodating response to non-cooperative behavior, especially when they personally feel the economic impact. For example, the spike in gas and energy prices that resulted from the sanctions imposed against Russia in the aftermath of its invasion of Ukraine in the West significantly reduced support for these sanctions in Germany and Poland (Kantorowicz and Kantorowicz-Reznichenko 2023) and led to calls to negotiate with Russia about ending the Ukraine war rather than maintaining an uncompromising stance. This is not surprising given that much research shows that voters' views on international matters tend to align with their own interests and values, irrespective of whether we look at security (Gartner 2008), support for international organizations (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Kiratli 2020), trade policy (Chaudoin 2014a; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Owen and Johnston 2017; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), or the environment (Bechtel, Genovese, and Scheve 2017; Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley 2022). High material costs are thus likely to make voters more willing to compromise with the challenging state. However, we can expect significant variation here as well, both with regard to the extent that voters worry about the societal impact of the material cost of non-accommodation and the extent to which they are personally affected. For example, in the Brexit negotiations, European citizens living in regions that were heavily exposed to the potential fallout from a hard Brexit were significantly more supportive of compromising with the UK in the Brexit negotiations EU than those living in regions relatively sheltered from the economic costs of a hard Brexit (Jurado, Léon, and Walter 2022; Walter 2021b).

Finally, voters will have a much harder time choosing between responses in accommodation dilemma situations, that is situations in which non-accommodation can be very costly in material terms, and in which accommodation risks large reputational damage. The dilemma will be particularly acute for those who are personally exposed to any costs associated with non-accommodation and at the same time strongly care about the reputational consequences of accommodation for their country.

Although this discussion suggests that voters have quite a refined understanding of (high-profile) foreign policy situations, political elites nonetheless have considerable agency in

how voters evaluate the trade-off between material and reputational costs (Pevehouse 2020). Cues and actions of political elites tend to influence voters' foreign policy attitudes (De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021; e.g., Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020; Guisinger and Saunders 2017). How elites frame a certain international issue and which considerations and trade-offs they emphasize can therefore have strong effects on how voters want their government to respond in international politics (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Levendusky and Horowitz 2012; Nguyen and Spilker 2022). This means voters' support for a more or less accommodating negotiation stance is likely to be influenced by how policymakers frame the costs and benefits of the choice between accommodation and non-accommodation. This, in turn, potentially gives policymakers intent on pursuing a non-cooperation strategy a policy tool to build the domestic support coalition that is necessary to make non-accommodation a credible and effective policy strategy.

Hypotheses

Taken together, these considerations give rise to several hypotheses. First, I expect that *individuals concerned about their country's reputation and the long-term reputational risks associated with accommodation will be more likely to support a tough, non-accommodating response* (H1a). Likewise, to the extent that elite framing matters with respect to how individuals assess possible response options to non-cooperative behavior, this discussion suggests that *emphasizing the reputational risks associated with accommodating another state's challenge should make voters less supportive of an accommodating response (H1b).*

In contrast, when non-accommodation is associated with high material costs, this should dampen enthusiasm for this kind of response. This means that *individuals concerned about the material costs of a non-accommodating response should be more willing to compromise and to accommodate non-cooperative behavior* (H2a). Again, elite messaging and framing should equally have an effect. Thus, *messages that highlight the material costs of non-accommodation should thus decrease voters' support for a non-accommodating strategy (H2b).*

It is harder to predict what will happen in accommodation dilemma situations, where both accommodation and non-accommodation come with considerable cost. This dilemma is likely to be particularly pronounced for individuals who care about both types of cost, and for individuals who receive messaging emphasizing that both accommodating and not accommodating carry costs. Given that either response is likely to be costly, I expect that highlighting this accommodation dilemma reduces voters' willingness to fully accommodate or to pursue a very uncompromising stance, and to seek some middle ground instead. As a result of this accommodation dilemma mechanism, *voters' support for non-accommodation should*

be moderated when they care both about reputation and the material consequences of non-accommodation (H3a), and when not just the benefits, but also the costs of this strategy are emphasized (H3b).

Research Design

To empirically examine how voters want their government to respond to non-cooperative behavior of other states and to evaluate the argument that these preferences are shaped by the trade-off between the material and reputational costs of different strategies, I conducted public opinion surveys and survey experiments in a variety of actual situations in which states face non-cooperative behavior from others.

I focus on three types challenges by other states. A first set of analyses looks at states' *attempts to cherry-pick*, that is situations in which states try to negotiate exceptions from common rules that would put them in a privileged position relative to others. Using data from respondents in all EU-27 member states, this first set of analyses examines how respondents want the EU to respond to British and Swiss attempts to negotiate a new (UK) or revised (Switzerland) set of rules for access to the EU's internal market that allows them to retain significant access to the market together with significant exceptions that other EU member states are not granted. A second set of analyses focuses on a severe forms of non-cooperative behavior and examines how respondents want their government to respond to a *serious violation of international law* by other states, examines how respondents in Finland, Hungary and Sweden assessed sanctions against Russia in response to its 2022 invasion in Ukraine. Finally, a third set of analyses examines *coercive bargaining* in international negotiations, that is a negotiation strategy that relies on the use of threats, pressure, or force to compel another party to agree to specific terms or concessions. Specifically, I examine Finland's and Sweden's response to Turkey‘s blockade of NATO accession in 2022/23, and Hungary's response to a threat from the EU to significantly cut EU funding to Hungary unless the country implement judicial reforms. In each of these settings, I explore how respondents' concern about the material and reputational consequences of different response options influence voters' willingness not to accommodate international negotiation partners. Using survey experiments, I additionally evaluate how highlighting the costs of different negotiation strategies affects support for accommodating and non-accommodating negotiation strategies.

Examining these questions in actual, ongoing, real-life contexts has several advantages, but also creates some challenges: Rather than presenting respondents with abstract situations,

asking them about ongoing situations allows us to glean their opinions on actual questions confronting their governments at the time of the survey. Moreover, it allows me to examine my hypotheses for different types of non-cooperative behavior and across different country settings, including a not fully democratic one (Hungary). Moreover, most of the situations are also high-profile issues, which means that we are likely to get real, rather than hypothetical responses. Finally, the contexts vary with regard to the challenger's and the respondent countries' levels of democracy. In the cherrypicking cases, democratic states are challenged by another democratic state, in the Russia sanctions case, democratic states are challenges by an autocratic state, in the NATO negotiations case, two democratic countries are challenged by a democratically backsliding state (Turkey) and in the rule of law case a democratic backsliding country (Hungary) is challenged by a set of democratic countries. All this increases the external validity of this study. However, this his approach also creates a number of challenges. For one, each setting is different so that tailored questions are needed that vary across settings, creating problems of comparability. Moreover, because I am studying framing effects on highly politicized issues, respondents are likely to have already formed opinions on the issue at hand, so that it will be harder to elicit a response with experimental manipulations. Taken together, the real-life setting is therefore likely to make it harder to find strong and consistent effects both within and across settings.

Figure 1: Dependent Variable: Preferred Responses to challenges by other states



To make the analyses as comparable as possible across the different contexts, all analyses follow the same general setup. In all cases, the dependent variable is support for a non-accommodating response to another state's non-cooperative behavior, measured as respondents' answers to questions about how the government (and in two cases the EU) should respond in a given situation. Figure 1 shows the distribution of these answers:[1] Higher values denote support for a more non-accommodating, uncompromising stance – such as not allowing any exceptions to cherry-picking states, imposing tougher sanctions on Russia, or not compromising with Turkey or the EU in coercive bargaining situations. Figure 2 shows that in most contexts, respondents tend to be rather unsupportive of accommodating challenges by other states, but this resolve varies both across individuals and across contexts

I use both observational and experimental methods to examine how respondents' weight the trade-off between material and reputational concerns. In the observational part, I use information about respondents' exposure to the material consequences of non-accommodation and their concerns about the reputational consequences of accommodation. The main part of the analyses are vignette survey experiments that randomly vary the reputational and material costs of different response strategies. Table 2 shows the general setup of the survey experiments across all types of settings, which mirrors the 2x2 matrix in figure 1. Figure 1 also informs the expectations about the effect of the different treatments: As treatment 1 highlights the reputational cost of accommodation, it is expected to increase support for non-accommodation. In contrast, treatment 2 highlights the material cost of non-accommodation and is therefore expected to reduce support for this response. Finally, treatment 3 combines both types of costs and thus reflects the accommodation dilemma; here the expectation is that respondents exposed to this treatment will moderate support for non-accommodation and accommodation, placing the expected effect between those in treatment 1 and 2.

Table 2: Experimental setup

Control group: Introductory text describing the situation	**Treatment 2:** Introductory text + information about material cost of non-accommodation
Treatment 1: Introductory text + information about reputational cost of accommodation	**Treatment 3:** Introductory text + information about both types of cost (reputational and material)

[1] Details on the operationalization are provided below.

In the discussion below, I present the research design, the observational, and the experimental results in three sets, one for each type of challenge.

Challenge 1: Attempts to cherrypick

The first set of analyses looks at how respondents evaluate other states attempts to negotiate exceptions from common rules that would put them in a better position than their own state. The focus here is on the EU, which is a useful case both because the Single Market lays out common rules to which all member states need to adhere, and because this idea has recently been challenged by two countries, post-Brexit UK and Switzerland, both of which have tried to negotiate a new (UK) or revised (Switzerland) set of rules for Single market access that would give them access to the market together with significant exceptions that other EU member states are not granted.

Research Design

I use data collected in the context of two larger, EU-wide online omnibus surveys (the 'EuroPulse') conducted by Dalia Research in June 2019 (Switzerland case, 10 792 respondents) and December 2019 (post-Brexit UK case, 11 543 respondents). Negotiations with Switzerland and the UK were ongoing negotiations while the survey was in the field.[2] In each survey wave, a census representative sample of working-age[3] respondents from all EU member states were surveyed, with sample sizes roughly proportional to their population size. The data were weighted using information from the most recent Eurostat statistics.

The observational analysis examines how respondents' concern about the material consequences of non-accommodation and the reputational consequences of accommodation are associated with their resolve not to accommodate non-cooperative behavior. To measure the former, I use a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents choose "maintaining my country's trade relations with the UK" as the most important goal for the Brexit negotiations ongoing at the time in a pre-treatment question that gave respondents a choice of five different goals.[4] The latter is operationalized with a respondent's support for the EU, measured as indicating a strong preference for their country to remain a member of the EU in a hypothetical

[2] For the UK, the focus at the time was on completing the Withdrawal Agreement, which did, however, already contain some text on the contours of the future, post-Brexit UK-EU relationship.
[3] Ages 18-65. See Walter (2021b) for more details about the survey.
[4] The goals were: 1) Avoid that other countries leave the EU in the future, 2) Punish the United Kingdom for leaving the EU, 3) Maintain my country's trade relations with the UK, 4) Establish a standard procedure that makes it easier for countries to leave the EU in the future, 5) Avoid a failure of the Brexit negotiations and a no-deal Brexit at all cost.

referendum vote, because research has shown that these people are particularly concerned about the stability of the EU (Walter 2021a).[5] The observational analyses additionally control for gender, education, age, and whether a respondents lives in a rural area, uses weights and estimates a multilevel model that takes into account that the data were collected in 27 different national contexts.

For the experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one control and three treatment groups. The control group received the general information about the respective negotiations and the key issue of disagreement between the two sides. Respondents in three treatment groups additionally received information about the costs of accommodation and/or non-accommodation as described above. Table 3 shows the detailed text that each of the groups received.

Table 3: Set-up of cherry-picking survey experiments

Control group: **Intro text on context**	**Treatment 2:** **Cost of Non-Accommodation**
UK: After Brexit, the UK and the EU will have to negotiate about their future relationship. They particularly disagree about how much the UK will have to adhere to EU rules in this new framework in return for wide access to the EU market. **Switzerland:** The EU and Switzerland are negotiating about having closer economic relations. They disagree about how much Switzerland will have to adhere to EU market rules in this new framework.	Intro text (control) + "The EU is concerned that **trade relations between the UK and the EU would deteriorate** if the negotiations failed ."
Treatment 1: **Cost of Accommodation**	**Treatment 3:** **Accommodation Dilemma (both costs)**
Intro text (control) + "The EU is concerned that **other member states will also insist on exceptions** from EU rules if the UK/Switzerland were granted exceptions"	Intro text (control) + The EU is concerned that **other member states will also insist on exceptions** from EU rules if the UK/Switzerland were granted exceptions. At the same time, it worries that **trade relations between the UK/Switzerland and the EU would deteriorate** if the negotiations failed."

Note: Bold text added for ease of reading; respondents did not see any emphasis in the text.

[5] Results are robust to operationalizing EU support as a preference for maintaining the current division of power between national governments and the EU or transferring more power to the EU.

Directly after the experiments, respondents were asked how the EU should respond in each of these two cases, prompting them to indicate whether the EU should offer the UK/Switzerland wide access to the EU market with many (0), some (1), only very few (2), or no (3) exceptions from EU rules. Higher values denote fewer exceptions and hence indicate support for non-accommodation, whereas lower values indicate support for accommodation. Answers to this question serve as dependent variable both in the observational and experimental analysis (see also Figure 1).

Even though respondents were randomly assigned to the control and three treatment groups, my baseline specification includes the same demographic control variables as in the observational analysis.[6] In addition, a pre-treatment question asks respondents about whether the EU should take a hard (non-accommodating) or soft (accommodating) approach to the then ongoing Brexit negotiations with the UK to proxy respondents controls for respondents' pre-treatment level of resolve. This is important because we know that voters do not just care about the reputational effects of the government's negotiation behavior, but also about the substantive issues at stake (Chaudoin 2014a). The baseline specification again uses weights and a multilevel structure. To explore the robustness of the results, I additionally re-estimate the observational and experimental analyses using models that do not account for the multi-level structure, models that include country level controls and weights, and models that neither control for country context nor include any weights (full results are shown in the appendix).

Responding to Cherry-Picking: Results

Both the observational and the experimental analyses suggest that voters react to the trade-off between material and reputational concerns in the way predicted by the argument. The results of the observational analyses, which are shown in Table 4, show that respondents who see the EU positively support a significantly less accommodating response to British and Swiss attempts to cherrypick. These individuals are likely to be more concerned about the reputational ripple-effects of granting these countries gain broad access to the EU's Single market without requiring them to adhere to all its rules (such as free movement or acceptance of the European Court of Justice as chief arbiter) and therefore are less enthusiastic about granting them exceptions. In contrast, respondents who care about their country's trade relations and are therefore more likely to be concerned about the material fallout at risk from not accommodating British and Swiss demands, are more willing to grant both countries access to the Single market while at the same time allowing them to take the exceptions they desire.

[6] Results are robust to using no controls.

The observational analysis provides some first suggestive evidence that voters care both about the reputational and the material effects of responding to other countries' challenges. The experimental analysis provides a more rigorous test of this hypothesis.[7] The results shown in Figure 2 are remarkably similar across cases. As expected by H1, highlighting the reputational costs of accommodation increases support for non-accommodation: When respondents learn that the EU is concerned that other member states will also insist on exceptions from EU rules if the UK/Switzerland were granted exceptions (treatment 1), respondents are less willing to agree to exceptions from EU rules. Support for non-accommodation in this group is significantly higher than in treatment group 2, which highlights the material costs of non-accommodation, a possible deterioration of trade relations between the EU and Switzerland/the UK. Surprisingly however, highlighting the material consequences of accommodation does not move people's stance relative to the control group. One possibility is that these risks have featured prominently in the public debate, especially with regards to the UK and the potential consequences of a no-deal Brexit, so that these effects may already have been priced in. Another possibility is that this finding reflects individual-level evidence that the material cost of economic sanctions does not drive approval of sanctions (Onderco 2017). But this finding is in line with the expectations formulated in H2.

Interestingly, the strongest effect on voters' opinions occurs in the accommodation dilemma treatment (T3), which emphasizes both the reputational costs of accommodation and material risks associated with non-accommodation. Informing respondents about the EU's concern that granting exceptions might spark similar demands among other member states and its concern that bilateral EU- UK/Switzerland trade relations between would deteriorate if the negotiations failed, has a clear positive effect on respondents' resolve for non-accommodation.[8] This contradicts the expectation that highlighting the trade-off between the reputational risks of accommodation and the material costs of non-accommodation dilemma should dampen support for non-accommodation (H3). One possible explanation of this puzzling finding is that voters intuitively understand the value of costly signals. The fact that non-accommodation is costly, allows challenged states to send costly, and hence credible, signals to challenging states that

[7] A table with full regression results and various robustness checks can be found in the appendix.
[8] The effect is statistically significant at the 99% level for Switzerland, but only scratches statistical significance in the UK analysis.

Table 4: Summary of results of observational analyses: OLS regression coefficients on proxies for reputational and material concerns

		Cherrypicking		Russia sanctions			NATO accession negotiations with TR		EU rule of law demands
		EU27-UK	EU27-CH	Finland	Sweden	Hungary	Finland	Sweden	Hungary
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reputational concerns	pro-EU sentiment	0.197***	0.090**						
		(0.02)	(0.04)						
	More defense spending			0.252***	0.163***				
				(0.03)	(0.03)				
	Concerned about Russian Aggressiveness					0.195***			
						(0.03)			
	Importance of minority rights protection						0.100***	0.098***	
							(0.03)	(0.03)	
	importance of national soovereignty (index)								1.518***
									(0.07)
Material concerns	Maintaining trade most important Brexit goal	-0.056**	-0.018						
		(0.02)	(0.04)						
	Dissatisfaction with Economy			-0.011	-0.083***	-0.117***			0.144***
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.04)
	Support NATO accession						-0.191***	-0.326***	
							(0.03)	(0.03)	
	HU judiciary not independent								-0.045*
									(0.03)
	Concern about corruption in HU								-0.084***
									(0.03)

they are resolved not to accommodate their non-cooperative behavior (Fearon 1997). The costs of non-accommodation thus increase the effectiveness of the strategy, both in terms of deterring similar challenges in the future and in terms of increasing the odds that the challenging state backs down and (re)engages in cooperative behavior. If voters have an intuitive understanding that this mechanism can increase the effectiveness of a non-accommodation strategy, highlighting both the risks of accommodation and the costs of non-accommodation could increase in support for non-accommodation. Unfortunately, the evidence at hand here does not allow us to corroborate this alternative mechanism.

Figure 2: Responding to Cherrypicking: Experimental Results



Notes: Regression coefficients from multilevel models for the three treatment groups relative to the control group, controlling for demographics, awareness of the Brexit process, and pre-treatment support for accommodation in the Brexit withdrawal negotiations.

Overall, the case of responding to cherry-picking attempts provides some evidence in line with this paper's argument, but also some puzzling results. Several explanations might explain the unexpected findings. For example, access to the Single market is not necessarily a topic that most voters care about, deteriorating trade relations may not actually be perceived as a major cost, or results may be driven by the fact that both the UK and Switzerland come from a position where they used to enjoy special privileges relative to other EU member states in the form of opt-out (UK) or tailored bilateral treaties (Switzerland). Given these open questions about this case, I next turn to a context where the non-cooperative behavior by the challenging

state is obvious, where the reputational and material concerns associated with different strategies are clear, and where all this has been prominently discussed in the public debate, so that respondents are likely to have informed opinions: Responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Challenge 2: Serious violations of international law

After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 in a clear breach of international law, especially the territorial integrity norm, Western countries imposed significant sanctions on Russia. These sanctions have not only hurt Russia, but have also imposed significant costs on sanctioning countries. Public opinion on these sanctions has been divided, both among individuals and among countries, where there is for example a clear divide in public support between democratic and non-democratic countries (Ngo, Huynh, Nguyen, and Nguyen 2022). Because Russia did not end its war against Ukraine in response to the sanctions, a tightening of the sanctions regime has been repeatedly discussed and implemented. I use this context to study how voters assess a further tightening of Russian sanctions in the context in which they are likely to be highly aware both of the high material costs of sanctioning (as a non-accommodating response to Russia) and of the reputational risks of encouraging future Russian aggression or similar behavior by other countries associated with prematurely lifting the sanctions, thus accommodating Russia's non-cooperative behavior. To study how voters asses possible responses in this context, I examine voters' preferred response to continued Russian aggression in three countries: Sweden, Finland, and Hungary. These cases are interesting to study because they are all geographically close to Russia, but vary in their governments' approach to responding to the Ukraine war. While Sweden and Finland have sought to integrate closer with the West and have worked to strengthen the sanctions regime against Russia, the Hungarian government has taken a much more cautious approach and has openly criticized and opposed the EU's efforts to tighten sanctions.

Research Design

Data were collected in two survey waves. I used online surveys conducted by Bilendi&Respondi to survey approximately 3000 Finnish and Swedish citizens each in November 2022 and 3255 Hungarian citizens between March and May 2023 (see also Malet and Walter 2023). The survey company used quota sampling to obtain representative samples of the national electorates, although this goal was only partially achieved in Hungary. I therefore use survey weights in the analyses below. The questionnaires used in the three countries are

similar, but some variables were only asked in some contexts and not others, and sometimes slightly different wording was used.

The dependent variable is the same in all three countries, and records respondents' support for tightening the sanctions that Western countries had imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Respondents were asked "What should [Sweden/Finland/ Hungary] do regarding the current economic sanction regime against Russia?" and prompted to record their answer on a 0-10 scale ranging from a preference for accommodation (fully lift sanctions – 0) to non-accommodation (imposing many more sanctions – 10). Figure 1 shows that the distribution of this dependent variable varies significantly across contexts. While Swedish and Finnish respondents were strongly in favor of tightening the regime in November 2023, opinions were much more varied in Hungary in spring 2023, with the modal response at keeping sanctions at current levels. Public opinion on sanction thus is in lockstep with government positions, which was much more supportive of sanctions in Sweden and Finland, and much more skeptical in Hungary.

The analysis again includes both an observational and an experimental part. I proxy reputational concerns with variables that indicate respondents' support for more defense spending in Sweden and Finland and concern about Russia's growing military aggressiveness in Hungary[9] Both reflect long-term concerns about security, that also imply concern about the country's reputation for being able to defend itself. About 39% of respondents in Finland and Sweden support a significant increase in defense spending, reflecting heightened concerns about national security risks in these countries, whereas about 49% of Hungarian respondents are strongly concerned about Russian aggressiveness.[10] Concern about the material consequences of further sanctions is operationalized with a variable that measures dissatisfaction with the economy on a 0 (very satisfied) to 10 (very dissatisfied) scale, based on the assumption that the additional economic strain of sanctions will be higher for those who are troubled by the state of the economy. The analyses additionally control for political interest, left-right placement, government satisfaction, risk propensity,[11] and gender, education, age, and rural area residence.[12] I also control for whether respondents' see Russia as the main aggressor in Ukraine, and hence in serious breach of international law. There are significant country

[9] Both variables range from 0 (greatly decrease defense spending/not at all concerned about the growing military aggressiveness of Russia) to10 (greatly increase spending/very much concered).
[10] Results are robust to using dummy variables that use values of 8 or higher as cutoff points, rather than continuous variables.
[11] Only in the Finland and Sweden analyses.
[12] The experimental analyses include all variables from the observational analysis as controls; results are robust to estimating treatment effects without any controls.

differences on this line with questions. Whereas a large majority in Finland (90.1%) and Sweden (85.6%) believe that Russia rather than NATO is mainly or fully responsible for "the current situation in Ukraine", only 36.1% of Hungarian respondents see Russia as the main aggressor as compared to Ukraine.[13] Almost the same share (35.4%) believe that Ukraine and Russia are equally responsible, 18.0% see Ukraine as more responsible, and 10.6% declined to respond. Because the argument assumes that voters share the perception that the other state is challenging international norms, I present the results for both the full sample and an analysis restricted to those who see Russia as the main aggressor in Ukraine. The experimental setup follows the same structure as before, using the context-specific text provided in table 5. The dependent variable was recorded directly after presenting respondents with the vignettes.

Table 5: Design Russa sanctions survey experiment

Control group: Intro text on context	**Treatment 2: Cost of Non-Accommodation**
"In response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, Western countries have imposed heavy economic sanctions on Russia"	Control text + "Lifting the sanctions before Russia complies with international law again is risky, because it **may encourage further aggression by Russia or other countries** in the future."
Treatment 1: Cost of Accommodation	**Treatment 3: Accommodation Dilemma**
Control text + "**Energy prices** and **inflation** in [Sweden/Finland/Hungary] have risen and a **recession** is looming as a consequence of the sanctions."	Control text + „Energy prices and inflation […] as a consequence of the sanctions. At the same time, lifting the sanctions [….] may encourage further aggression by Russia or other countries in the future." (*order of the costs was randomized*)

Note: Bold text added for ease of reading; respondents did not see any emphasis in the text.

Responding to Russia's severe violation of international law: Results

How should governments respond to Russia's aggression in regime, and what role do reputational and material considerations play in how voters evaluate possible responses? Starting again with an observational analysis, columns 3-5 in Table 4 show that those concerned about their country's security (measured as support for more defense spending or concern about Russia's aggressiveness as a proxy for reputational concerns) are much more supportive of

[13] Note that the question asked about the responsibility of Russia vs. NATO in Sweden and Finland, and the responsibility of Russia vs. Ukraine in Hungary.

imposing more sanctions on Russia in an effort to end this or at least deter future non-cooperative behavior. At the same time, respondents who are dissatisfied with the economy and therefore more exposed to the material costs of further sanctions tend to be less likely to support a further tightening of sanctions. As expected, these two concerns pull respondents in different directions, suggesting that those concerned both about security and the economy face a dilemma.

Figure 2: Responding to serious norm breach: Experimental Results



Notes: Regression coefficients from OLS models, including all controls discussed in the text.

Turning to the experimental analysis, the findings in Figure 3 align with some expectations and depart from others. As in the analyses on cherrypicking, we a see a U-shaped pattern among the treatments, where the vignette that highlights the material cost of the sanction leads to significantly lower support for a further tightening of sanctions than either the control group, or the reputation treatment. In Hungary, however, this result only holds for the subgroup of respondents that believe that Russia is the main aggressor in Ukraine. Among the full sample of respondents (and especially who do not see Russia as predominantly responsible for the war), the cost-treatment curiously leads to significantly higher support for tighter sanctions. Moreover, the treatment presenting respondents with the accommodation dilemma leads to significantly higher support for sanctions tightening than the cost treatment alone. When respondents are informed not just about the material costs of sanctions, but also the reputational

risks associated with easing the sanctions, most respondents become more hawkish on sanctions. As in the analyses before, the reputation effect seems to dominate the cost effect.[14]

Whereas these findings are broadly in line with the theoretical expectations, it is surprising that all treatments *reduce* support for tighter sanctions relative to the control group. One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that the issue of Russia sanctions was a very prominent issue, so that respondents probably had rather strong opinions on this issue going into the experiment. It is possible that the time needed to read the longer treatment vignettes gave respondents more time to reconsider their gut reaction, which may have prompted them to take a more cautious stance. This underlines both the methodological challenges associated with running survey experiments on politicized issues and the importance of doing this as policymakers often need to communicate in such contexts.

Challenge 3: Coercive bargaining

To further explore how voters react to prominent challenges from abroad, the third set of analyses focuses on two instances of coercive bargaining, where another country or a set of countries try to pressure the government to change a policy in line with their preferences. The first instance focuses on Turkey's blocking of Swedish and Finnish NATO accession to coerce these countries to change their policy of providing a safe haven to Kurds. This confronted Finland and Sweden with the question of how to respond to Turkey's demand that they stop supporting Kurdish groups, for example by extraditing people that Turkey considers terror suspects. The second example focuses on Hungary, which has been backsliding in terms of democracy and rule of law for quite some time. In 2022, the EU used its new rule of law conditionality mechanism to freeze billions of euros budgeted for Hungary due to concerns over the respect of the rule of law and corruption.[15] As a result, the Hungarian government had to decide whether to comply with EU demands and to implement reforms aimed at increasing judicial independence and tackling corruption, or not.

Research Design

The data come from the same surveys used in the previous analyses. In Finland and Sweden, the dependent variable focused on negotiations with Turkey and asked "*In your view, how many compromises should Finland make in the negotiations with Turkey in order to enable*

[14] The order of the cost and reputation statements in the «both» treatment were randomized in this experiment. There are no significant framing effects that would suggest that this effect is predominantly driven by the order oft he information provided.
[15] 6.3 billion euros in regional funds and 5.8 billion euros from the new COVID recovery fund.

the country to join NATO?” Answers were recorded on a 0-10 scale, ranging from “no compromises at all” (0) to “fully comply with Turkish demands” (10). In Hungary, respondents were asked *“In your opinion, to what extent should the Hungarian government implement the reforms the EU is demanding?”,* with answers ranging from 0 (accommodation: “The government should implement all the reforms”) to 10 (non-accommodation: “The government should not implement any reforms”).

To probe whether reputational and material concerns correlate with respondents’ negotiation preferences in the way predicted by the argument, I again use context-specific measures. Because one of the main issues at stake in the negotiations with Turkey was the Scandinavian countries’ reputation for human rights’ protection, reputational concerns in Finland and Sweden are proxied with respondents’ views about the importance of human rights (measured on a 0 to 10 scale, with higher values denoting higher importance). In contrast, in Hungary the main issue with regard to reputation was to what extent the EU should be allowed to demand domestic institutional changes, a topic directly related to questions of national sovereignty. I therefore use a measure of individual views about national sovereignty, which is an index that calculates the mean answer of four questions (measured on a 1-5 scale), all of which tap into the relations between the EU and its member states (e.g., whether the EU should have the right to set measures binding for all, or whether Hungary should follow EU decisions with which the government disagrees). Because the material costs of non-accommodation in Finland and Sweden is the ability to join NATO, these costs are measured with a question about respondent’s degree of approval of their country’s decision to apply for membership. In Hungary, I use three variables, all measured on a 0-10 scale. Because not implementing the EU-demanded reforms risks giving up on substantial EU finds, I include respondents’ dissatisfaction with the economy. Moreover, because such a decision also implies a preservation of the status quo of the judicial system and level of corruption, I further include respondents’ concern about the state of the Hungarian judiciary, and concern about corruption by government officials. As before, all analyses additionally control for political interest, left-right placement, government satisfaction, gender, education, age, and rural area residence. In Sweden and Finland, I additionally control for support for more defense spending, risk propensity, and whether Russia or NATO is seen as main aggressor in the Ukraine war. In Hungary, I additionally control for views about EU integration. Importantly, both analyses include pretreatment sentiments as well. In Hungary, this comprises a general question on whether or not Hungary should compromise with the EU with regard to the EU’s repeated concerns certain reforms introduced by the Hungarian government violate EU rules and standards. In the

Swedish and Finnish survey, respondent's unconditional support for NATO membership can be viewed as a proxy for pre-treatment opinions.

The survey experiments follow a slightly modified, two-step design, as displayed in table 6.[16] In a first step, respondents were randomly distributed into a control group, which only received some information about the situation at hand, whereas a second group additionally received information about the costs associated with not accommodating Turkey's (in Sweden and Finland) or the EU's (in Hungary) demands. Using block randomization based on this first step, respondents then were asked a follow-up questions, with some respondents only informed that negotiations were still ongoing (control), and others additionally receiving information about the reputational costs of accommodating. At the end of step 2, respondents were asked on how they thought the government should respond to the respective situation; these are the dependent variables discussed above. Taken together, this setup again reflects the 2x2 setup familiar from the other experiments.

Table 6: Design coercive bargaining survey experiments

	Control Group (step 1)	**Material Cost Treatment (step 1)**
Control group (step 2)	**Control group:** Introductory texts describing the context	**Treatment 2:** **Cost of Non-Accommodation** Control text + material costs: • FI/SE: Security risks related to remaining out of NATO, highlighted by Ukraine war • HU: Access to over 10 bn € in EU funds
Reputation Treatment (step 2)	**Treatment 1:** **Cost of Accommodation** Control text + Reputational costs • FI: Future blackmail potential • SE: Human rights reputation • HU: Future EU interventions	**Treatment 3:** **Accommodation Dilemma** Control text + material costs + reputational costs

Note: Bold text added for ease of reading; respondents did not see any emphasis in the text.

Responding to coercive bargaining: Results

[16] This is because the first step included a second experiment on framing costs of non-cooperation in terms of potential gains or potential losses, see Malet and Walter (2023). To mirror the experimental setup throughout the paper, I drop respondents from the sample who received a gain-treatment in the first step oft he experiment.

How do reputational and material concerns shape voters' preferred government responses to coercive bargaining, especially in situations where stakes are high? As expected, the coefficients shown in Table 3 (columns 6 and 7) show that in Finland and Sweden, those who think that human rights protection is important are significantly less, and those who want to join NATO significantly more willing to compromise with Turkey. Likewise, in Hungary, those who strongly value national sovereignty are much less willing to implement the judicial reforms demanded by the EU.[17] Regarding material considerations, concerns about judicial independence and corruption in Hungary increase respondents' willingness to compromise, but surprisingly, dissatisfaction with the economy significantly increases support for non-accommodation. This is a puzzling finding.

Figure 4: Responding to coercive bargaining: Experimental Results



Notes: Regression coefficients from OLS models, including all controls discussed in the text.

The results of the survey experiments are shown in figure 4. With the exception of Sweden, the treatment effects display the familiar U-shaped pattern. In both Finland and Hungary, highlighting the reputational risks of accommodation yields the most uncompromising response, whereas the cost treatment leads to a higher willingness to accommodate. Especially in Finland, these effects are very pronounced and statistically strongly significant. Moreover, the accommodation dilemma treatment, in which both types of

[17] The observational analysis excludes the pretreatment variable about potentially compromising with the EU.

costs are highlighted, once more moderates support for non-accommodation. The Swedish results depart from this pattern however: None of the treatments have a statistically significant effect, and if anything, the cost treatment – emphasizing the security risks associated with remaining outside of NATO – makes respondents *less* willing to compromise with Turkey. These findings warrant closer inspection; they also once more highlight the challenges of examining framing effects in highly politicized contexts.

Conclusion

How do voters want their governments to respond to unilateral attempts to change the status quo in their favor? Do they support a tough stance and refuse any changes to the status quo? Or do they instead want their government to accommodate the challenging state so as not to risk what remains of the cooperation with that state?

Building on research about resolve, audience costs, and reputational concerns (Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Chaudoin 2014b; Fearon 1994; Kertzer 2016; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015) this paper has explored how framing the choice between different negotiation strategies affects public support for accommodation and non-accommodation. While much previous research has focused on security issues, the analysis in this paper has broadened the focus to a broader set of cases in which other states behave in a non-cooperative manner, such as the renegotiation of international agreements, violation of core international norms, and coercive bargaining situations. Presenting evidence from a variety of high-salience, real-life contexts in different countries, both the observational and the survey experimental analyses suggest that voters consider both the reputational and material consequences of different potential responses in such challenging situations. Across most of the diverse set of cases, statements that emphasizes the long term reputational risks of accommodation led to significantly more support for a "playing tough" strategy than statements that emphasized the costs associated with non-accommodation. Whereas vignettes that presented respondents with both types of costs usually moderated support for non-accommodation, demonstrating the difficulties of dealin with the accommodation dilemma, in many settings the reputation-effect seemed to dominate the cost effect.

These findings have important implications, both with regard to research and for policymakers. Substantively, these findings underscore the importance of reputational concerns that recent research has highlighted (Brutger 2021; Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Kertzer 2016) and show that such concerns also matter for foreign policy issues beyond the security realm. In methodological terms, the findings demonstrate the importance, but also the challenges of

running experiments in multiple, real-life contexts. Whereas international relations research has begun to discuss the trade-offs between running artificial and highly stylized survey experiments on the one hand, and the use of richer experiments more strongly rooted in actual political contexts (e.g., Brutger, Kertzer, Renshon, and Weiss 2022; Huddleston 2019), most survey experimental research still mostly relies on survey experiments in a single country-context (often even just one experiment). This paper suggests that it is possible and worthwhile to explore the external validity of an argument by running similarly-structured but context-adjusted survey experiments

In terms of policy implications, the findings suggest that policymakers have some room to garner public support for a tough foreign policy stance if they communicate the rationale for their strategy and the risks associated with accommodation clearly. For example, in the context of the West's challenge in keeping up public support for the sanction regime against Russia, my findings suggest that it will be important to highlighting what the sanctions are for, what long-term benefit Western societies are set to derive from them, and why capitulating may be associated with significant risks. Incidentally, the findings also suggest that there can be a payoff for policymakers if they do not downplay the costs associated with non-accommodation, but rather emphasize that demonstrating a willingness to accept these costs is likely to make the sanctions more credible and thus ultimately more successful. More generally, the results suggest that voters are capable of understanding more complex and medium-term arguments about strategic foreign policy considerations than some previous research has assumed.

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Appendix

1. **Detailed wording of the coercive bargaining survey experiments**

Finland & Sweden: Negotiations with Turkey over NATO accession

Control group “[Sweden/Finland] has recently applied for NATO membership..” (pre-treatment Q) «[Sweden/Finland] can only join NATO if all member states ratify [Swedish/Finnish] accession. Currently, Turkey is the only NATO member holding up this process. Turkey has said that it will only let [Sweden/Finland] join NATO if the country stops supporting Kurdish groups, for example by extraditing people that Turkey considers terror suspects.” «Negotiations between [Finland/Sweden] and Turkey about NATO accession are still ongoing.“	**T2: Cost of Non-Accommodation** Control text + “The war in Ukraine has highlighted the security risks [Sweden/Finland] faces if it remains outside NATO / the security benefits that [Sweden/Finland] would enjoy as a NATO member. [Sweden’s/Finland’s] exclusion from NATO therefore poses a real threat/is therefore very important to the country and the security of its citizens..”
T1: Cost of Accommodation Control text + Finland: “Some observers are concerned that complying with Turkish demands might encourage other countries to equally blackmail Finland on important policy issues in the future. ” Sweden: Negotiations between Sweden and Turkey about NATO accession are still ongoing. Some observers are concerned that complying with Turkish demands might damage Sweden’s reputation with regards to human rights protection.	**T3: Both cost** Control text + T2 Text + T1 text

Hungary: Negotiations with EU over judicial reforms

Control group “Relations between Hungary and the European Union have deteriorated over the last decade. The European Commission has repeatedly argued that certain reforms introduced by the Hungarian government violate EU rules and standards, and therefore demands changes.” (pre-treatment Q) «As part of this conflict, the European Union recently decided to freeze billions of euros budgeted for Hungary due to concerns over the respect of the rule of law and corruption. Hungary will not receive any payments until it approves reforms to increase judicial independence and tackle corruption.” «It is unclear how the government intends to respond to the EU’s demands. It could implement all the reforms, some of them, or none.“	**T2: Cost of Non-Accommodation** Control text + “If the government complies/does not comply with the EU’s demands, Hungary will continue to access/will lose access around 6.3 billion euros in regional funds, and will additionally gain/lose 5.8 billion euros from the new COVID recovery fund. Receiving/losing this money would greatly benefit/pose a real threat the recovery of the Hungarian economy, and improve the welfare of Hungarians.”
T1: Cost of Accommodation Control text + “Some say that if the government fully complies with the EU’s demands, the EU may be encouraged to intervene in domestic affairs more often in the future. ”	**T3: Both cost** Control text + T2 Text + T1 text

2. Regression results

Switzerland-EU negotiations: Single market access

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
main											
EU Brexit strategy	0.100***							0.103***	0.101***	0.115***	0.120***
	(0.01)							(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Trade most important	0.010	-0.025					-0.025		0.010	0.032	0.034
	(0.04)	(0.04)					(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pro-EU sentiment	0.066	0.090**					0.090**		0.066**	0.064***	0.053**
	(0.04)	(0.04)					(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Brexit awareness	-0.083***	-0.072***					-0.072***	-0.089***	-0.081***	-0.083***	-0.085***
	(0.02)	(0.01)					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
female	0.040	0.031					0.031	0.060***	0.040	0.058***	0.063***
	(0.03)	(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
education	0.040	0.049					0.049	0.033	0.038**	0.017	0.039***
	(0.03)	(0.03)					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
age	0.013***	0.013***					0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.00)	(0.00)					(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
rural	-0.006	0.000					0.000	-0.010	0.000	0.014	-0.012
	(0.03)	(0.03)					(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Reputation Treatment	0.035	0.029	0.043	0.041	0.077***	0.084***	0.029	0.045	0.034	0.062**	0.069**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cost Treatment	-0.044	-0.055	-0.049	-0.050	-0.064**	-0.058**	-0.055	-0.048	-0.045	-0.055*	-0.050
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Both Treatment	0.115***	0.109**	0.099***	0.098***	0.076***	0.084***	0.109**	0.104***	0.115***	0.089***	0.092***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
_cons	0.991***	1.282***	1.813***	1.651***	1.703***	1.860***	1.282***	1.074***	0.810***	0.865***	0.943***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.08)
lns1_1_1											
_cons	-2.123***	-2.124***	-1.979***				-2.124***	-2.079***			
	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.18)				(0.19)	(0.18)			
lnsig_e											
_cons	-0.075***	-0.066***	-0.054***				-0.066***	-0.083***			
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				(0.01)	(0.01)			
N	7264	7403	8706	8706	8706	8706	7403	8321	7264	7264	7264
r2				0.023	0.023	0.004			0.070	0.074	0.058
r2_a					0.019	0.004				0.069	0.056
F				5.321	6.962	11.479			11.847	15.622	40.394

Finland – Russia sanctions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
More defense spending	0.252***	0.258***	0.327***		0.034***		0.412***	0.252***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)		(0.00)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic dissatisfaction	-0.011	0.002	-0.103		0.001		-0.008	-0.011
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.13)		(0.01)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Responsibility Ukraine war	1.540***				0.243***			1.540***
	(0.09)				(0.03)			(0.09)
More defense spending (dummy)						1.002***		
						(0.09)		
Economic dissatisfaction (dummy)						-0.006		
						(0.13)		
Russia responsible Ukraine war (dummy)						4.382***		
						(0.26)		
Risk propensity	0.006	0.001	-0.048		0.002	0.010	-0.031	0.006
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.11)		(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
political interest	0.127**	0.122*	-0.020		0.021*	0.123*	-0.006	0.127**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.27)		(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
left-right placement	-0.000	0.002	-0.021***		0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
government satisfaction	0.063***	0.053**	0.267*		0.011**	0.074***	0.141***	0.063***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.14)		(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age	0.013***	0.018***	-0.032*		0.002***	0.014***	0.015***	0.013***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.097**	0.080*	0.170		0.011	0.100**	0.136***	0.097**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.20)		(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Male	0.436***	0.478***	-0.285		0.051***	0.451***	0.272***	0.436***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.46)		(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
(more) rural	-0.080**	-0.107***	0.202		-0.015***	-0.086**	-0.108***	-0.080**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.18)		(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Reputation Treatment	-0.183	-0.174	-0.309	-0.271*	-0.019	-0.198		-0.183
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.75)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.12)		(0.12)
Cost Treatment	-0.407***	-0.426***	-0.595	-0.543***	-0.059***	-0.435***		-0.407***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.77)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.12)		(0.12)
Both_Treatment	-0.261**	-0.263**	-1.096	-0.266*	-0.042**	-0.305**		
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.78)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.12)		
Both - cost first								-0.240*
								(0.14)
Both - reputation first								-0.283*
								(0.15)
Constant	-2.777***	4.550***	3.300*	7.805***	0.392***	1.536***	3.231***	-2.777***
	(0.57)	(0.45)	(1.98)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.42)	(0.50)	(0.57)
N	2505.000	2335.000	170.000	2766.000	2433.000	2505.000	2505.000	2505.000
r2	0.376	0.148	0.267	0.006	0.259	0.329	0.191	0.376

Sweden: Russia Sanctions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
More defense spending	0.163***	0.141***	0.271***		0.026***		0.240***	0.163***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)		(0.00)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Economic dissatisfaction	-0.083***	-0.026	-0.294***		-0.010**		-0.119***	-0.082***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.11)		(0.00)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Responsibility Ukraine war	1.312***				0.185***			1.312***
	(0.08)				(0.02)			(0.08)
More defense spending (dummy)						0.699***		
						(0.12)		
Economic dissatisfaction (dummy)						-0.282**		
						(0.14)		
Russia responsible Ukraine war (dummy)						3.343***		
						(0.24)		
Risk propensity	0.023	0.010	0.016		0.003	0.024	-0.015	0.022
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.11)		(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
political interest	0.148*	0.230***	-0.262		0.024*	0.164**	0.050	0.149*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.30)		(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
left-right placement	-0.002	-0.001	0.001		-0.000	-0.003	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
government satisfaction	-0.004	-0.021	0.120		-0.002	0.034	0.000	-0.004
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.11)		(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Age	0.018***	0.023***	0.012		0.002***	0.021***	0.026***	0.018***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.154***	0.138***	0.250		0.025***	0.152***	0.173***	0.154***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.19)		(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male	0.534***	0.752***	-0.989**		0.086***	0.491***	0.398***	0.536***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.42)		(0.02)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
(more) rural	0.016	0.030	-0.217		0.003	0.002	0.073	0.016
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.17)		(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Reputation Treatment	-0.212	-0.180	-0.548	-0.259*	-0.026	-0.201		-0.212
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.59)	(0.15)	(0.02)	(0.15)		(0.14)
Cost Treatment	-0.482***	-0.508***	-0.154	-0.534***	-0.079***	-0.477***		-0.482***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.58)	(0.15)	(0.02)	(0.16)		(0.15)
Both_Treatment	-0.327**	-0.270*	-1.224**	-0.533***	-0.039	-0.394**		
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.55)	(0.16)	(0.02)	(0.15)		
Both - cost first								-0.426**
								(0.18)
Both - reputation first								-0.233
								(0.19)
Constant	-1.315**	4.385***	5.013***	7.678***	0.675***	1.864***	4.137***	-1.324**
	(0.56)	(0.45)	(1.61)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.56)
N	2049.000	1824.000	225.000	2586.000	1978.000	2049.000	2049.000	2049.000
r2	0.304	0.120	0.262	0.007	0.211	0.253	0.115	0.305

Hungary: Russia Sanctions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Concern Russian aggressiveness	0.195***	0.186***	0.178***		0.045***		0.373***	
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)		(0.01)		(0.02)	
More defense spending	-0.117***	-0.086*	-0.148***		-0.011		-0.150***	
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.01)		(0.04)	
Economic dissatisfaction	0.952***	0.993***	0.653***		0.164***			
	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.13)		(0.02)			
Concern Russian aggressiveness (dummy)						1.066***		1.125***
						(0.12)		(0.12)
Economic dissatisfaction (dummy)						-0.413***		-0.393**
						(0.15)		(0.16)
Russia responsible Ukraine war (dummy)						1.952***		1.977***
						(0.13)		(0.14)
political interest	0.242***	0.319**	0.090		0.045***	0.208***	0.293***	0.200**
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)		(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
left-right placement	-0.157***	-0.158***	-0.146***		-0.032***	-0.181***	-0.245***	-0.203***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
government satisfaction	-0.215***	-0.264***	-0.170***		-0.031***	-0.171***	-0.280***	-0.158***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)		(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Age	-0.012***	-0.004	-0.026***		-0.004***	-0.011***	-0.008**	-0.012***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.038	0.194**	-0.094		0.001	0.035	0.080	0.056
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)		(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male	-0.103	0.140	-0.473***		-0.032	-0.169	0.055	-0.183
	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.14)		(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
(more) rural	-0.078	-0.086	-0.049		-0.005	-0.127***	-0.157***	-0.104**
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)		(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Reputation Treatment	-0.148	-0.048	-0.278	-0.100	0.011	-0.240	-0.163	-0.175
	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Cost Treatment	0.296*	-0.592**	0.937***	0.365**	0.068*	0.286*	0.222	0.290*
	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Both_Treatment	-0.123	-0.107	-0.235	-0.260	-0.004	-0.249	-0.216	
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.15)	(0.16)	
Both - cost first								-0.278
								(0.20)
Both - reputation first								-0.271
								(0.18)
Constant	2.788***	1.454	5.079***	4.963***	1.094***	5.746***	5.405***	5.721***
	(0.60)	(1.18)	(0.76)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.44)	(0.59)	(0.46)
N	2487	1056	1431	2986	2239	2662	2643	2511
r2	0.414	0.243	0.248	0.006	0.338	0.356	0.318	0.363

Finland: NATO negotiations with Turkey

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Important minority protection	0.100***		0.086***		0.085***	
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Support NATO accession	-0.191***		-0.205***		-0.204***	
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Important minority protection (dummy)	-0.056		-0.049*		-0.049*	-0.100***
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Support NATO accession (dummy)	0.274**		0.203**		0.197**	0.094
	(0.11)		(0.09)		(0.09)	(0.11)
More defense spending	-0.068**		-0.063**		-0.066***	-0.074**
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.03)
Russia responsible Ukraine war (dummy)	0.027		0.030		0.042	0.006
	(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.09)
Risk propensity	0.002		0.002		0.002	0.002
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
political interest	-0.059**		-0.057***		-0.058***	-0.072***
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.03)
left-right placement	0.039***		0.036***		0.036***	0.039***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
government satisfaction	0.006		0.023		0.022	0.005
	(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.06)
Age	0.410***		0.351***		0.350***	0.396***
	(0.13)		(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Education	-0.041		-0.043		-0.045	-0.021
	(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)	(0.05)
Male	0.358**	0.257	0.357**	0.257	0.357**	0.332**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
(more) rural	-0.290*	-0.392**			-0.095	-0.310*
	(0.17)	(0.17)			(0.14)	(0.17)
Reputation Treatment	0.014	-0.014			0.111	-0.028
	(0.17)	(0.16)			(0.14)	(0.16)
Cost Treatment			-0.288*	-0.392**		
			(0.17)	(0.17)		
Both_Treatment			0.084	0.005		
			(0.17)	(0.17)		
TR_cost_loss			0.013	-0.014		
			(0.17)	(0.16)		
TR_cost_gain			0.215	0.102		
			(0.17)	(0.16)		
TR_both_loss						0.606***
						(0.13)
TR_both_gain						-0.583***
						(0.14)
Constant	4.699***	6.329***	5.238***	6.329***	5.257***	5.257***
	(0.70)	(0.11)	(0.56)	(0.11)	(0.57)	(0.69)
N	1561.000	1831.000	2361.000	2742.000	2361.000	1608.000
r2	0.126	0.009	0.109	0.006	0.107	0.112

Sweden: NATO negotiations with Turkey

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Important minority protection	0.098***		0.121***		0.121***	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Support NATO accession	-0.326***		-0.315***		-0.315***	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Important minority protection (dummy)						0.606***
						(0.13)
Support NATO accession (dummy)						-0.583***
						(0.14)
More defense spending	-0.085**		-0.124***		-0.125***	-0.100***
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Russia responsible Ukraine war (dummy)	0.299***		0.368***		0.369***	0.094
	(0.11)		(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.11)
Risk propensity	-0.013		-0.045		-0.047	-0.074**
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
political interest	-0.207**		-0.131		-0.135	0.006
	(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.09)
left-right placement	-0.001		-0.001		-0.001	0.002
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
government satisfaction	-0.203***		-0.197***		-0.197***	-0.072***
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.032***		0.030***		0.030***	0.039***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	0.085		0.049		0.049	0.005
	(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Male	-0.092		0.020		0.016	0.396***
	(0.16)		(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)
(more) rural	-0.044		-0.006		-0.006	-0.021
	(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Reputation Treatment	0.143	-0.021	0.157	-0.021	0.158	0.332**
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Cost Treatment	0.286	0.047			0.278	-0.310*
	(0.20)	(0.20)			(0.18)	(0.17)
Both_Treatment	-0.052	-0.266			0.043	-0.028
	(0.22)	(0.22)			(0.18)	(0.16)
TR_cost_loss			0.297	0.047		
			(0.20)	(0.20)		
TR_cost_gain			0.258	0.195		
			(0.21)	(0.21)		
TR_both_loss			-0.051	-0.266		
			(0.22)	(0.22)		
TR_both_gain			0.131	0.080		
			(0.20)	(0.20)		
Constant	6.436***	6.006***	6.141***	6.006***	6.154***	5.257***
	(0.71)	(0.15)	(0.57)	(0.15)	(0.57)	(0.69)
N	1270	1703	1900	2542	1900	1608
r2	0.261	0.002	0.270	0.002	0.269	0.112

Hungary: Judicial Reform negotiations with EU

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Sovereignty concerns	1.518***	0.516***					0.519***	0.517***
	(0.07)	(0.09)					(0.08)	(0.08)
Economic dissatisfaction	0.144***	0.078***					0.060**	0.061**
	(0.04)	(0.03)					(0.02)	(0.03)
Concern independence judiciary	-0.045*	-0.037					-0.057***	-0.056***
	(0.03)	(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)
Convern about corruption	-0.084***	-0.017					-0.040**	-0.040**
	(0.03)	(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)
EU-sentiment	-0.005**	-0.004**					-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.00)	(0.00)					(0.00)	(0.00)
political interest	-0.107	0.026					-0.010	-0.011
	(0.07)	(0.06)					(0.05)	(0.05)
left-right placement	-0.014	-0.004					0.013	0.013
	(0.03)	(0.02)					(0.02)	(0.02)
government satisfaction	0.135***	0.064*					0.032	0.033
	(0.04)	(0.03)					(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.010***	-0.010***					-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.00)	(0.00)					(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	-0.242***	-0.187***					-0.181***	-0.180***
	(0.06)	(0.05)					(0.04)	(0.04)
Male	0.073	-0.031					0.030	0.031
	(0.11)	(0.09)					(0.08)	(0.08)
(more) rural	0.002	-0.001					0.004	0.005
	(0.04)	(0.03)					(0.03)	(0.03)
Pretreatment willingness to compromise		-0.574***		-0.769***		-0.755***	-0.540***	-0.540***
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Reputation Treatment	0.246*	0.352***	-0.100	0.237*	-0.100	0.232*	0.337***	0.337***
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Cost Treatment	0.116	0.190	-0.269	0.044				0.139
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.13)				(0.12)
Both_Treatment	0.081	0.215*	-0.073	0.134				0.259**
	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.12)				(0.11)
EU_cost_loss					-0.232	-0.058	0.098	
					(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.14)	
EU_cost_gain					-0.269	0.039	0.177	
					(0.23)	(0.13)	(0.14)	
EU_both_loss					0.010	0.101	0.313**	
					(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.14)	
EU_both_gain					-0.073	0.131	0.203*	
					(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.12)	
_cons	-0.184	5.824***	3.247***	7.943***	3.247***	7.860***	6.071***	6.058***
	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.59)	(0.60)
N	1611	1599	2027	1984	3051	2991	2400	2400
r2	0.599	0.721	0.001	0.645	0.002	0.616	0.698	0.698