Citation:
Abstract:
In situations where other states behave non-cooperatively, governments need to decide whether to accommodate or take a tough stance against this behavior. In doing so, they face an “accommodation dilemma”: Even though a tough stance can be materially costly, governments have incentives to sanction and not accommodate non-cooperative behavior for reputational reasons. However, bringing voters on board with this approach can be challenging. This paper examines to which extent the trade-off between the material benefits of cooperation and reputational considerations influences the extent to which citizens are willing to support a tough and materially costly response. Using survey experiments embedded in real-life contexts, it examines how voters respond to the accommodation dilemma across three types of non- cooperative behavior: a) cherry-picking attempts and non-compliance, b) serious violations of international law and c) coercive bargaining in international negotiations. Across all cases, the experiments show that highlighting the reputational risks associated with accommodation tends to make voters less willing, and highlighting the material consequences of non-accommodation more willing, to compromise. Dilemma situations, in contrast, are difficult: Sometimes the willingness not to accommodate is strengthened when both types of cost are emphasized, sometimes muted. Overall, the paper shows that voters understand strategic foreign policy considerations and care about their country’s reputation beyond the security realm.